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Abstract
The marketing and strategy literature hail strategic flexibility as a key success factor in creating continuously customer value and
generating competitive advantage. However, empirical evidence indicates that rigidity in market strategies and actions is more the rule than
the exception in organizations. The focus of this special issue is on better understanding rigidity and flexibility in business markets. This lead
article seeks to elaborate on why companies face rigidity and how they can create flexibility. To do this, we relate rigidity in organizations to
the concepts of dominant logic, industry recipe and persistence. The case illustrations highlight barriers to the development of absorptive
capacity in business organizations. Identifying such barriers is a first step in better understanding how companies can remain agile and
flexible in demanding and fast changing markets. The paper then proceeds with a brief introduction to the other contributions of this special
issue and concludes with a research agenda.
D 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The focus of this special issue is on better understanding
rigidity and flexibility in business markets. The discussion
of rigidity and flexibility is often linked to escalating levels
of environmental turbulence. Dynamic business markets call
for a new marketing approach and increasing strategic
flexibility in business organizations. Consider the following
arguments made in the literature.
According to Sheth and Sisoida (1999), new growth
economics based on knowledge assets and increasing
returns to scale, market diversity and simultaneous
competition and cooperation create a new marketing
context that undermines marketing’s lawlike generaliza-
tions. Hitt, Keats, and DeMarie (1998) pinpoint strategic
discontinuities such as the elimination of industry
boundaries, fewer distinctions between industrial and
service businesses, major advances in logistics, computer
aided design and communication, hypercompetitive mar-
kets and the opening of global markets. Eisenhardt (2002)
argues that the global, Fhigh velocity playing field_ creates
unstable and unpredictable business conditions which
make strategy temporal. Facing these challenges, market-
ing managers and their organizations are forced to be
alert, learn quickly, transform ideas quickly into action,
and revise marketing plans continuously. Hitt et al. (1998)
state that success in the 21st century organization depends
on the creation of flexibility and on the ability to balance
stable and fluid states. However, when competitive rules
change and markets are reconceived, major incumbents
and/or the more successful players might be the slowest to
adapt. They might remain stuck in existing customer
relations and networks. They might be too focused on
known performance drivers and existing market concep-
tions. Hence organizational and market routines hinder
necessary adaptations.
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strategic flexibility is one of the most important yet most
difficult tasks of managers and companies in dynamic
environments. They define strategic flexibility ‘‘as an
organization’s capability to identify major changes in the
external environment, to quickly commit resources to new
courses of action in response to change, and to recognize
and act promptly when it is time to halt or reverse such
resource commitments’’ (p.45). Strategic flexibility is a
multidimensional concept. Evans (1991) describes how
flexibility maneuvers might be developed before or after a
triggering event. It might be based on offensive or defensive
logics, resulting in four types of flexibility. Golden and
Powel (2000) define flexibility as the organizational
capacity to adapt to environmental changes. They describe
how different conceptions of flexibility vary in terms of (1)
the length of time needed to respond to environmental
changes, (2) the range of options available, (3) the
perspective taken (offensive or defensive) and (4) the focus
area in which the flexibility is created (external or internal).
To further substantiate the key role of flexibility in
industrial marketing, we explore in the next paragraph two
situations in which industrial companies are challenged to
revise their market strategies and fail to do so. A third
section focuses on an interpretation of these observed
phenomena. Rigidity present in the case illustrations leads
to a conceptual reasoning that relates (the lack of) flexibility
to the construct of absorptive capacity. Building flexibility
requires the development of absorptive capacity. Therefore,
identifying the barriers to this development is a first step in
better understanding how business organizations can remain
agile and flexible in demanding and fast changing markets.
In the fourth section, the different articles of the special
issue are introduced. The article closes with an agenda for
future inquiry into the flexibility issue.
2. Rigidityinmarketingdecisionmaking:twochallenging
situations
Consider the following situations in which a number of
business marketers face a variety of challenges and threats,
forcing them to display strategic flexibility.
2.1. Case situation 1: Declining margins and the anxious
search for value additions in the installation industry
The Dutch electro technical installation industry can be
characterized as a stable industry. As entry barriers are low
and exit barriers appear to be high, fierce competition has
characterized this industry for years. In periods of economic
downturn the rivalry among incumbents becomes a struggle
for life with heavy price competition. The industry focuses
on the design, installation and maintenance of electro
technical installations for energy generation, distribution
and transformation, and on installations for data generation,
transmission, monitoring, etc. Although customer problems
tend to be diverse requiring tailoring and specific designs,
most installers focus on the pure installation and main-
tenance stages of projects, thereby facing bidding processes
and dominant price competition. Nevertheless, the industry
is complex with a wide range of techniques and potential
applications that give room to further specialization or even
niche strategies. These applications lie in the construction
and refurbishing of private houses, offices, dwellings,
infrastructure (e.g., tunnels), and industrial applications
(e.g., calibration of machines or automation of industrial
production processes). The industry is fragmented (although
some Fcluster_ companies exist) because local market
presence, close to the applications, is required.
Typically, new technologies are introduced by upstream
suppliers such as ABB, Schneider or Alcatel. The installer
buys these components directly from the manufacturer or
(mostly) through wholesalers. Installers are supplier inde-
pendent, i.e., they remain indifferent as to the specific brand
requested and prescribed by the end customer. Most
installers complain about the overall working conditions.
On the one hand, they had to upgrade their technical skills
dramatically due to built-in intelligence in components and
ever increasing complexity in installations. On the other,
margins remained under pressure. Over the last five years,
some installers went for a differentiation strategy and
created new value added perspectives. The majority, though,
continued to follow the mainstream.
One of these new perspectives aimed at the position of
Fsystem integration_. Pioneers in this first group intended to
building a broad competence-driven company able to tackle
the total electro technical problem of the customer, and
offering an integral service solution to any application. At
the same time, they understood that this focus required
subcontracting of specific activities. Another group of
pioneers went for pure specialization. Building upon the
reputation of their company, they went after the most
complex projects (e.g., in the security field, in information
and communication networks etc.) and focused on the
engineering, contracting and maintenance of highly tech-
nology-intensive projects. Again, simpler tasks are out-
sourced. A final group of firms went for the opposite
direction: operational excellence. These firms stripped off
their organizations from Funnecessary_ high technology
units in order to focus on the fast and efficient realization
of relatively simple projects. Predominantly, these firms
relied on sound cost calculations, scale efficiencies, multi-
task personnel and efficient productivity.
Experts agree that these three revised generic strategies
make sense in this industry and could all three lead to a
differentiated position and improved margins. Nevertheless,
companies’ strategic intents seem hard to be realized. Most,
if not all, companies did not succeed in streamlining their
organizations in the direction of one of these revised
strategies. The old market behavior of companies’ local
affiliates persisted. In fact, local affiliates Fkept their people
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any project, even the type of projects that did not fit with the
renewed corporate strategy. Moreover, while in most cases
customers did appreciate these revised market strategies of
their suppliers, their buying behavior remained the same.
They continued to leave limited room for supplier initiatives
and integral solutions. As a consequence, pure price
competition persisted.
2.2. Case situation 2: Facing adverse conditions in
international business markets
Company Alpha is a Dutch value added reseller of used
business vehicles. Although the company has only about
150 employees, it can be considered a globally dominant
company in its industry. The rationale for its worldwide
sales lies in the life cycle of commercial vehicles. A truck,
for instance, might be newly bought in the more developed
markets such as the Netherlands or Germany. After about
four years, the owner disposes off its used vehicle and sells
it to company Alpha, which ships it, after necessary
refurbishment, to less advanced markets such as Eastern
Europe. Some years later, the used truck is bought again,
refurbished and shipped to Africa or South America. Today,
Alpha is doing business in more than eighty countries.
In the mid 1970s, the company started exporting to
Belgium, as the Belgian life cycle lagged behind the Dutch.
However, as the Belgian life cycle caught the Dutch, the
Belgian affiliate changed from a local sales office into a
second hub for the local purchase and international sales of
used vehicles. The subsidiary gained high levels of
autonomy and started to specialize on the African mar-
ket—a market the Dutch had not aimed at until then. This
dual-hub situation lasted for more than ten years. In the late
1980s, headquarters installed a more transparent control
system and found out that the Belgian hub was (1)
cannibalizing Dutch activities and (2) operated in a far less
efficient and professional way. Surprisingly, Dutch head-
quarters decided to increase its commitment to the daily
operations of the Belgian subsidiary, and significantly
supported and guided the Belgian affiliate. After some
years of increased commitment of headquarters, autonomy
was reinstalled and a new management team with local
people was appointed. Things started to get worse soon and
by the mid 1990s a third management change took place.
Since the late 1980s, it had been clear to a majority of the
Dutch board that this double-hub structure could not work.
Yet, a belated decision to close down the subsidiary in the
mid 1990s was overruled after intensive lobbying by the
Belgian CEO. Eventually, in 1996, after 20 years of local
activity and seven years after the strategic misfit had
become clear, the Alpha group closed the Belgian affiliate.
Company Beta is a mid-sized diversified technology
concern designing, engineering and building industrial
installations in the oil, gas, chemical and pharmaceutical
industry. It has about 20,000 employees. Sixty five percent
of its sales are generated abroad, and internationalization
often initiated by following key clients with international
projects. Local subsidiaries build strong network ties with
subcontractors and engineering partners. Some years ago,
the company withdrew from the strategically important UK
market after a process of nearly twenty years.
Many years the company served the British market
profitably from the Netherlands, but gradually the need for a
local affiliate grew. The UK operation was set up in the
early 1980s and the subsidiary was considered not only
important for the UK market but was also attributed a role of
coordinator for the Far and Middle East markets. During the
1980s, the UK market evolved into a Fturnkey_ market:
projects were outsourced to a responsible main contractor
who absorbed the risks. To keep pace with this evolution
and to increase scale, the UK affiliate intended to merge
with a UK contracting company in 1985. The Dutch
headquarters did not agree with this move (considered as
outside of the core business), and eventually blocked it.
After this critical incident, headquarters gradually
reduced the UK subsidiary’s strategic role. The responsi-
bility for the Far East, an ever more important region for the
group’s expansion, was resumed by the headquarters. The
UK affiliate was downsized. Yet, local UK management
tried to reverse the situation by pursuing growth. However,
acquired projects were often very risky and beyond the UK
affiliate’s core competencies. In 1998, a large project
remained Funfinished_ due to unresolved technical problems
and the cash flow of the project turned out to be very
problematic. At that moment, headquarters decided to close
down the UK subsidiary. After this decision, though, it still
took some years to implement the market withdrawal
because of warranties and other unsolved technical issues
in the projects at hand.
3. Case discussion
Although the cases in both situations focus on different
strategic marketing decision, there are remarkably similar
processes at work. In both situations, managers see the need
to change their course of action. In Case situation 1
companies belonging to any of the three Fdifferentiator
groups_ stress the urgency of a strategy reorientation.
However, they do not dare to fully implement their chosen
strategy as they experience Fobstruction_ from local man-
agers, traditional customer behavior and deeply ingrained
marketing practices. They are confronted with a way of
working in the industry and in their own companies that
makes them doubt on the feasibility of the new strategy.
The so-called Findustry recipe_ (Spender, 1989) acts as a
major obstacle to move. Rigidity lies not only in the existing
customer relations and the way of doing business with each
other (e.g., based on tenders with closed specifications).
Also organizational structures and routines (e.g., divisional
silos) and a power struggle between local managers and
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structure of these companies makes the communication
between local managers (who want to fill their order books
at any cost) and headquarters Fstrategizers_ (who want to
Finvest_ in the new strategy even if that implies some
temporary downsizing) very difficult. Unless flexibility can
be created and dynamic capabilities are unleashed (e.g., in
the creation of an independent entrepreneurial venture
focusing only on specific type of projects) no successful
business case can be built, and support for the new strategy
pulverizes during the first economic downturn that has to be
confronted.
In Case situation 2 similar processes pop up. A
significant gap between actual and expected performance
stimulates a strategic reaction, but internal power plays
block swift reaction. In both situation 2 cases, causal
ambiguity and the uncertainty about the best course of
action block any decision to withdraw. To the contrary, in
both cases additional investments were decided upon.
Emotional arguments seem to downplay strong (negative)
signals and might lead to Fpersistence_ (Audia, Locke, &
Smith, 2000). Strategic drift can last many years until a Ffait
accompli_ is reached, i.e., a critical incident damaging the
reputation or performance dramatically, or the existence of
new, objective data proving the dead end street nature of the
strategy. At that moment, nearly everyone in the organ-
ization accepts that resources can be better allocated in
alternative projects. The availability of clear alternative
options facilitates the withdrawal decision (Pauwels &
Matthyssens, 2004).
4. Towards a market-focused conception of strategic
flexibility
Strategic flexibility is gaining importance in creating
competitive position and in realizing financial performance
for companies. Young, Sapienza, and Baumer (2003)
uncovered how flexibility of trading relationships with
buyers and suppliers (the willingness of parties to adapt to
new knowledge without resorting to new contracts or
renegotiations) is a significant determinant of a firm’s
productivity. Strategic flexibility was demonstrated also to
have a positive influence on firm performance after the
Asian crisis, especially in environments with high compet-
itive intensity. In such environments, flexibility should be
emphasized and market orientation de-emphasized (Grewal
& Tansuhaj, 2001).
Johnson, Pui-Wan Lee, Saini, and Grohmann (2003)
have pointed towards the skewed perspectives on strategic
flexibility. The majority of the literature focuses on internal
and reactive perspectives. Strategic flexibility is hardly
linked to strategically crucial market-linking activities.
According to these authors, market-focused flexibility
undergirds the firm’s success and superior performance.
They define this concept as ‘‘the firm’s intent and
capabilities to generate firm-specific real options for the
configuration and reconfiguration of appreciable superior
customer value propositions’’ (2003:77). This options
perspective is in line with Bowman and Hurry (1993).I n
general, it is thought that a market-driving approach will
result in a relatively higher level of market-focused strategic
flexibility than a market-driven approach (see also Tuomi-
nen, Rajala, & Mo ¨ller, 2004). However, current market
orientation literature focuses on maintaining the status quo
in customer relations rather than on driving the market.
Early contributions on strategic flexibility took a func-
tional and rational approach to strategic flexibility. Aaker
and Masceranhas (1984), for instance, put forward that three
methods can be applied to all functional areas: (1) increasing
a firm’s diversification strengths, (2) investment in under-
used resources and (3) the reduction of commitment of
resources to a specialized use. In the margin, though, the
authors have mentioned organizational facilitators such as a
decentralized structure or externally oriented mindsets.
Later on, strategic flexibility is more considered as an
organizational process rather than an economic strategy
(e.g., Volberda, 1998).
Hitt et al. (1998) advise companies to use a mix of
actions to build flexibility and competitive advantage: such
as, (a) developing dynamic core competences, (b) focusing
and developing human capital (e.g. contingency workers
and outsourcing), (c) effectively using new technologies
(e.g., IT or flexible manufacturing systems), (d) engaging in
valuable strategies (e.g., cooperation), and (e) developing
new organization structures and culture (e.g., horizontal
structures). Also Johnson et al. (2003) situate strategic
flexibility within a resource-based view of the firm: the firm
must develop a portfolio of capabilities that creates a bundle
of options. The development of strategic options requires
‘‘the development of critical resource identification, acquis-
ition, deployment capabilities, and option identification
capabilities within the firm’’ (2003:87).
The latter conceptualization is clearly linked to the
constructs of dynamic capabilities and absorptive capacity.
Dynamic capabilities are embedded in organizational
processes. Such capabilities enable the firm to reconfigure
its resources and adapt to new market conditions (Eisen-
hardt & Martin, 2000). Absorptive capacity is ‘‘a dynamic
capability pertaining to knowledge creation and utilization
that enhances a firm’s ability to gain and sustain a
competitive advantage’’ (Zahra & George, 2002: 185). An
interesting and promising perspective of Zahra and George
(2002) is the distinction between potential and realized
absorptive capacity. The former refers to knowledge
acquisition (speed, scope, direction) and assimilation
(understanding, interpretation) and provides firms with
strategic flexibility and adaptation potential. Realized
absorptive capacity centres on knowledge transformation
and exploitation.
The exposure to diverse and complementary external
sources, as well as past experience influences the develop-
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by activation triggers. Internal triggers can be crises or
important events for a firm. External triggers are events
impacting on the future of the industry. The two case
illustrations in the preceding section show that companies,
when faced with a need for market strategy reorientation
might have to face obstacles in creating strategic flexibility
and adapting their strategy. Their potential absorptive
capacity is only activated slowly, and it seems hard for
them to realize their absorptive capacity. Enriching the
analysis of strategic flexibility with the notion of barriers to
the development of absorptive capacity holds potential to
overcoming the so-called relevance gap (Starkey & Madan,
2001) in applying the recommendations of the Fstate-of-the-
art_ literature on strategic flexibility. So far, we see that
managers might feel that the literature does not contribute
directly to their managerial role and does not help them to
address the rigidity challenges they face. As described by
Starkey and Madan (2001), learning is less than half if it
does not enhance managers’ capability to take relevant
action. It seems so far that a majority of recommendations in
the area of strategic flexibility could not be applied
successfully because of a neglect of cognitive and organiza-
tional issues.
In fact, most contributions on flexibility neglected the
barriers to strategic flexibility. A notable exception is a
recent paper by Shimizu and Hitt (2004) that focuses on the
difficulties managers face in developing strategic flexibility.
They pinpoint three types of barriers:
– Barriers to attention: complacent mindset, organizational
inertia leading to the ignorance of everything that
deviates from the routines.
– Barriers to assessment: blaming external factors, over-
investing while hoping for a dramatic turnaround, etc.
– Barriers to action: environmental uncertainty, resistance
to change, resource constraints, etc.
A vicious cycle of strategic rigidity might result. These
barriers are clearly present in the case situations of this
paper (see Table 1).
In the two case situations, we have encountered barriers
to the development of absorptive capacity (see Table 1). On
all four components of absorptive capacity (acquisition,
assimilation, transformation and exploitation of knowledge)
barriers prevent further growth. In specific situations,
business marketers have difficulty to identify, acquire and
frame relevant market and performance data. Often, they
only engage in single loop learning and do not seem to
manage questioning their present courses of action. External
factors are often blamed, which feeds persistence, the more
when the company has shown positive performance recently
(Audia et al., 2000).
Assimilation might be blocked by causal ambiguity such
as is the case in international market problems and high
degrees of inertia, eventually leading to the ignorance of
strong (negative) signals. The transformation process seems
to be blocked by Fpoliticking_ between headquarters and
affiliates or among different functions not willing to share or
collaborate (as is the case in installation companies
interested in offering integral solutions requiring intense
collaboration of different functions). The result is that the
organization cannot be aligned to the new strategy. During
exploitation, persistence by local affiliates, the lack of
options, and existing market linkages seem to block the
development of absorptive capacity and thus strategic
flexibility.
This analysis shows that cognitive biases and limitations
as well as organizational inertia and political fights between
different coalitions (those in favor of and those against a
Table 1
Barriers to absorptive capacity in two case situations
Components of ACAP
(Zahra & George, 2002)
Barriers
Case illustration 1 (differentiation) Case illustration 2 (Market Exit)
Acquisition h Perceptual schemata distorted by history (it has always
been like this...!) and industry recipe
h Objective and complete market and
financial data missing
h Limited market information gathered
h Single loop learning rather than double loop learning takes place h Single loop learning
h External factors blamed h External factors blamed
Assimilation h Reactive nature of installers (Fwaiting for projects_) limits speed
of adoption time horizon
h Ignorance of deviating strategies
h Causal ambiguity remains for a long time
h High degree of inertia and escalation
of commitment
Transformation h Local affiliates do not internalize the new strategy direction h Successive new management teams,
hence no consistency
h Difficult to align organization structure to strategy h Political decision making and rivalry
headquarters-subsidiary
Exploitations h Local affiliates persist with old strategy of grasping
Fany_ opportunity
h Local affiliates persist with
Fbusiness as usual_
h Customers do not change their buying behavior
and persist with detailed tenders
h Lack of alternatives
Resistance to change
P. Matthyssens et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 34 (2005) 547–554 551strategic change) might disrupt the building of dynamic
capabilities (such as absorptive capacity). As a consequence,
managers remain committed to their initial strategy and top
or marketing managers cannot overcome the resistance to
change of lower organizational echelons.
The company keeps on acting in line with the industry
recipe notwithstanding growing signals of need for a
drastic strategy reorientation. In the case situations of the
international market exits, the availability of alternatives
and the arrival of new, unbiased managers or new
information act as triggers to strategic flexibility. In the
case of the differentiation strategy renewal (installation
companies), a series of limited successful business cases
and/or dramatic performance deterioration may act as a
trigger to change.
The consequence is clear. Creating strategic flexibility
in business markets is not just a matter of choosing the
right strategy. It requires the creation of the right
organizational preconditions (dynamic capabilities) and
of infusing value creation and market focus into the
notion of strategic flexibility (Johnson et al., 2003;
Shimizu & Hitt, 2004).
5. Introduction to the special issue
The purpose of this special issue is to explore in some
depth how to create flexibility in Business-to-Business
marketing settings. It intends to unveil antecedents, drivers,
routes towards and consequences of (strategic) flexibility
and rigidity in business markets.
Contributions cover a wide range of perspectives on the
subject of strategic flexibility (further SF) as well in terms of
research topics as in methodologies. In terms of topics,
authors agree on the importance of flexibility in today’s
dynamic markets and offer insight in the determinants,
drivers and inhibitors of flexibility. Their lenses zoom in on
different aspects though. Some focus on intra-firm processes
such as supply management or manufacturing, whereas
others focus on inter-firm issues. Regarding the latter, the
creation of flexibility in business relations is specifically
targeted. Papers reinforce the dialectic role of customer ties
and market relations, simultaneously feeding and blocking
flexibility. In terms of methodologies this special issue is a
good mirror of the state-of-the-art in research methods
applied in Business-to-Business marketing. One paper is
purely of a conceptual nature. Of the remaining six papers,
one uses a qualitative approach, one uses a mixed method-
ology, and four use a (predominantly) quantitative method-
ology. Next, we shortly introduce each paper of this special
issue.
5.1. Infusing flexibility
In the first contribution, Elisa Fredericks presents a
literature review based on a multidisciplinary perspective,
utilizing a resource-based view and a contingency lens.
She stresses the importance of SF in response to
environmental uncertainty and offers a set of options
open to firms to enhance intra- and inter-firm flexibility.
Propositions on inter-firm flexibility focus on the increas-
ing positive influence of (formal) strategic alliances on SF
under higher degrees of environmental dynamism, and on
performance both in general terms as in new product
development output. Propositions on intra-firm flexibility
stress the importance of intra-firm sense making, infor-
mation sharing, cooperation, coordination and the moder-
ating effect of intra-firm conflict.
5.2. Flexibility in service relations
Grounded in relationship marketing, relational contract-
ing theory and transaction cost theory, and analyzing data
from a sample of German market research firms, Bjoern
Ivens scrutinizes the role of flexibility in business
relationships of service providers. Findings confirm the
importance of flexibility for relational quality, leading to
customer satisfaction, and trust and commitment. Results
also give insight into the determinants of flexibility in
relationships. Flexibility grows with relation-specific
investments, uncertainty, Fmutuality_ a n dl o n gt e r m
orientation.
5.3. Relations and market inertia
Michael Beverland digs into the seemingly paradoxical
role of relational commitment: relationships are a trigger
for adaptation while at the same time leading to inertia.
Analysis of case studies and network interviews in the
New Zealand wine supply chain lead to the conclusion
that, when an industry matures, firms need to comple-
ment deep relationships with weak market-based ties in
order to remain in touch with emerging trends. These
weaker relationships help refreshing and strengthening
the incumbents’ position within their key established
networks.
5.4. The role of customer relations in creating flexibility
All companies face a major challenge of adapting their
marketing strategy to the Internet reality. Monica Perry and
Alan Shao studied a sample of advertising agencies to see
how they developed new Internet advertising services.
More specifically, they study whether a customer and
competitor orientation acts as an inhibitor or as a driver of
effective adaptation. The analysis shows that client
orientation hindered performance of Internet based serv-
ices, whereas competitive orientation stimulates it. Also
client diversity and client competition have a positive
impact on the success of new Internet related services.
These findings offer a valuable insight: a strong client
orientation might lead to a reactive mindset, but a focus on
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stimulate product adaptation and growth.
5.5. Purchasing and supply chain management flexibility
Larry Giunipero, Diane Denslow and Reham ElTan-
tawy present an exploratory study with a mixed method-
ology (focus groups and a survey) that aims at developing
an initial framework for the skills required by purchasing/
supply chain (P/SC) managers to attain flexibility in their
domain. Entrepreneurial P/SC managers score consistently
higher on flexibility skills than less entrepreneurial P/SC
managers. The changing business environment requires a
new skill set for P/SC professionals, emphasizing entre-
preneurial actions in managing risks, making decisions,
planning, interpersonal communication, in using influence
and persuasion, and in being internally motivated to find
creative solutions to business problems. The authors plead
for training on entrepreneurship and creativity for P/SC
professionals.
5.6. Marketing inertia and supply chain performance
Michael Smith, Richard Lancioni and Terence Oliva
present an exploratory study on the impact of inertia on
SCM (supply chain management) via quantitative model-
ing (catastrophe modeling) to study SC (supply chain)
responsiveness, and via questionnaire data for testing and
validation. SC costs account for nearly a third of a firm’s
overall operating overhead. This study shows clearly the
impact of inertia in SCM on productivity. Supply chain
management is a multidimensional process, in which
flexibility, agility, responsiveness and speed are key
success factors that might be thwarted by inertia. The
methodology presented is innovative and holds potential
for the study of SCM responsiveness across various
production strategies.
5.7. The role of customer knowledge
With the help of structural equations modeling, Cindy
Claycomb, Cornelia Dro ¨ge and Richard Germain show
that applied customer knowledge fully mediates the
relation of both manufacturing to order (MTO) and
Froutineness_ of production technology with performance.
As such, this study shows two routes to financial
performance: enhanced MTO operating through applied
customer knowledge and enhanced production technology
Froutineness_ through applied customer knowledge. In
further analyses, the authors scrutinize a subsample of
mass customizers (per definition working along the two
routes mentioned above). Results confirm empirically that
for mass customization, applied customer knowledge and
low inventory levels are key to performance. As such this
study shows that managers can combine flexibility and
efficiency and can use an array of production strategies
by using customer knowledge at different stages of
production.
6. Agenda for future inquiry
Abundant research opportunities exist in the areas of
rigidity and flexibility of market strategies. Next, we raise
eight topics for future research. A first issue is the need
for infusing managerial cognition into the conceptions of
rigidity and flexibility. In line with Young et al. (2003),
this study pinpoints the relevance of managerial percep-
tions and decision-making frames and approaches in
blocking or stimulating flexibility. Second, the role of
information and information systems in the generation of
strategic flexibility and in overcoming resistance needs
more attention. Causal ambiguity seems to play a major
role as a blocking mechanism. Hence, future research
might focus on how and which information can reduce
causal ambiguity. Third, the role of present market
relations as a hindrance or as a tool for organizational
learning and the generation of flexibility warrant further
scrutiny (Tuominen et al., 2004). Some contributions in
this special issue are also addressing this issue. A fourth
area warranting research attention is the relation between
absorptive capacity and strategic flexibility. The Shimizu
and Hitt (2004) recommendations for creating the
capability to maintain strategic flexibility need to be
tested. On the one hand, this study has shown how
organizational, managerial and industry barriers might
create strategic rigidity. On the other, the study demon-
strates the importance of organizational preconditions in
the form of a capability configuration shaping strategic
flexibility. The Zahra and George (2002) framework offers
potential in this perspective. A fifth area of attention is
the role of industry recipes (Spender, 1989) in creating
strategic rigidity in business markets. What makes up an
industry recipe and how can it be Fbroken_? Sixth, it is
important to test the typology of Evans (1991). In fact,
strategic flexibility can be conceived as a mix of offensive
and defensive, as well as anticipative and reactive
maneuvers. Seventh, the study of strategic flexibility and
rigidity in business markets will be enriched when
researchers focus on how to overcome dysfunctional
persistence, both due to escalation of commitment, i.e.
the belief that a previously unsuccessful strategy will
succeed in the future if more is invested, and to the
Fparadox of success_, i.e. the belief that a winning strategy
will succeed in the future, notwithstanding different
environmental conditions (Audia et al., 2000). Interesting
might be how affiliates which are closer to the market,
differ in this respect from headquarters. An eighth
research topic is the creation of options. As shown in
this exploratory study, the (non)availability of alternatives
and the managerial perceptions of options might be a key
determinant of strategic flexibility. How business market-
P. Matthyssens et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 34 (2005) 547–554 553ing managers create and value bundles of options warrants
further attention (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Johnson et al.,
2003).
Overall, the different papers of this special issue all
suggest further avenues for research into rigidity and
flexibility in a business marketing context. As such, we
feel confident this special issue is a renewed start for
additional inquiry into the topic.
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